Abstract:
The paper discusses the mechanism and processes of nationalism and religion at work in Kashmir and the consequent evolution and assimilation of the Kashmiri identity into the pan-national identities determining the birth of India and Pakistan. This process was not one-sided and was in fact mutually reinforcing. The genesis of the Kashmir imbroglio was in a land conflict which initially was on the lines of class conflict underwent transformation under the matrix of the anti-colonial politics in India into a major ethno-religious conflict. Identity is continuously evolving and often multidimensional, especially at the local level, but the process of colonialism created ‘hard’ categories which were till then rather ‘fluid’ identities. The paper refers to some local customs in this regard as evidence to buttress the argument. Finally it goes on to point the flawed understanding of the Kashmir conflict within the strategic community in India and a possible way of taming the violence and ultra-nationalism and the impediments that it might face in that process.
The paper discusses the mechanism and processes of nationalism and religion at work in Kashmir and the consequent evolution and assimilation of the Kashmiri identity into the pan-national identities determining the birth of India and Pakistan. This process was not one-sided and was in fact mutually reinforcing. The genesis of the Kashmir imbroglio was in a land conflict which initially was on the lines of class conflict underwent transformation under the matrix of the anti-colonial politics in India into a major ethno-religious conflict. Identity is continuously evolving and often multidimensional, especially at the local level, but the process of colonialism created ‘hard’ categories which were till then rather ‘fluid’ identities. The paper refers to some local customs in this regard as evidence to buttress the argument. Finally it goes on to point the flawed understanding of the Kashmir conflict within the strategic community in India and a possible way of taming the violence and ultra-nationalism and the impediments that it might face in that process.
Background:
After the death of
Ranjit Singh in 1849 the British Empire having fought two Anglo-Sikh wars was
finally able to subdue the Sikhs state. One of the courtiers of the Lahore
based kingdom who helped the British in their quest was Gulab Singh, the Dogra
ruler of Jammu. The British rewarded him
through the treaty of Amritsar of 1846, which handed over the valley of Kashmir
forever to the Maharaja Gulab Singh (Ayesha Jalal, 2004, p. 51) . This was
done as a matter of convenience and a model that was replicated in other
places, the British did not want to directly administer a state far flung in
the north which was not much of a revenue generator for them. In the aftermath
of the 1857 rebellion the British had
abandoned the policy of outright annexation as the crown took over from the
company and princess were incorporated in the imperial framework as
collaborators (Rai, 2004, p. 10) .
Identity manufactures Conflict:
The pre –colonial Mughal, Afghan and Sikh empires in Kashmir were hardly
interested in consulting the Kashmiris to determine their acquiescence or
otherwise to their own rule (Rai, 2004, p. 4) . But it was
during the Dogra rule that an individual ruler with personalized sovereignty
dismantled the earlier traditions of layers of authority sharing at various levels
in the Kashmiri society (Rai, 2004, p.
4) .The
cost-benefit analysis dictated that the administration be handed over to the Dogra
king who enjoyed considerable autonomy and had to send in small amount of
tribute as evidence of his continuing loyalty to the British. In return he
enjoyed the protection of the paramount colonial power and had no need to draw
any legitimacy from the majority Kashmiri Muslims.
Dogra rule had publicly declared its
‘Hindu’ affiliation and this reflected in the autocracy, bureaucracy and
military which were clearly dominated by the Hindu minority. There was a small
Kashmiri valley Muslim elite that enjoyed the patronage of the Dogra state
other than the five per cent Hindu minority of the valley known as the Kashmiri
Pandits. Kashmiri Pandits had historically been part of the administration in
the Afghan period when they became proficient in Persian and became revenue
administrators (Koul, 1924,
p. 19) .
They continued to be office bearers under the Dogra Regime along with the
Sayyid and Pir families of Kashmiri Muslims (Zutshi, 2003, p. 62) . These three
classes received revenue free land grants from the rulers in return for their
services (Wingate, n.d., p. 18) . Although
many Kashmiri Pandits were simply cultivators in the rural areas, they along
with Sayyeds and Pirs received considerable concessions in taxes while the
Kashmiri Muslim received no such benefit (Zutshi, 2003,
p. 62) .
The consequence was the transition to the first ‘indirect’ colonial rule in
Kashmir. The class conflict emerged in this period between the landed Dogra
versus the Muslim peasantry which was the first seed of what would later
culminate into a major ethno-religious conflict. The anti-Dogra movement that
emerged in the 1930s, was therefore a reaction by the deprived community of
Kashmiri Muslims against the injustices by a ‘Hindu’ state but even at this
point of time it was still a regional movement and had not identified itself
with the idea of a monolithic Indian Muslim community pitted against the Hindu
community, in fact it fought for its political and economic rights only in the
regional context.
More importantly even the Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims were not
monolithic groups. Kashmiri Muslims were divided into Sheikhs who were
descendents of Hindu converts of Islam, Sayyids, Mughals with central Asian
origins and Pathans with Afghan origins, while the Kashmiri Pandits were
divided into Guru or Brachbhat the astrologer class, and Karkun (Zutshi, 2003, p. 11) . There were
also some occupational groups like the Doms (village watchmen), Galawans
(horse-keepers) and nomadic tribes like Gujjars and Bakarwals who also came
under the category of Kashmiri Muslims (Zutshi, 2003,
p. 11) .
Kashmir society was based on a very secular Sufi tradition of Islam which did
not come to Kashmir through conquest as in some other parts of the country
rather it merged with the local Kashmiri tradition. GMD Sofi in his work Kashir
observes "The cult of Buddha, the
teaching of Vadata, the mysticism of Islam have one after another found
congenial home in Kashmir". Therefore even though Kashmir had always
been a multi-religious society it always had a distinct regional identity of
its own. In fact there were shrines like Chara-i-Sharif which until recently
were frequented both by Hindus and Muslims (Das, 2001, p. 29) . And some
spots like Shah-i-Hamdam mosque, Baha-ud-din shrine and Akhum Shah Mosque which
are still being used by both Hindus and Muslims (Tremblay, 1985) . Kashmiri surnames like Bhatt
and Pandit are common to Hindus and Muslims (Das, 2001, p. 29) . This
concurrence reflected in their food, drink and dress as well (Das, 2001, p. 29) . But the most
important link here is the language Kashur which belongs to the Dardic subgroup
of the Indo-Aryan family and is spoken by both, the Hindus and the Muslims in
the Kashmir.
Conflict manufactures Identity:
The fact is that the Muslim in Kashmir was actually very different from the Muslim
in Bengal or from the Muslim in Hyderabad. But by the 1940s it was the process
of colonialism that had first solidified the many fluid identities into one
creating a new structure of the society and then went on to create from what
had till then only been a social category, a political category of Muslims in
the sub-continent and this process was further expedited by the way nationalism
was defined by an upper class Hindu elite which excluded the other communities
and minorities. This was conspicuous in the way Tilak used Ganesh Puja and the
Shivaji festival to propagate nationalism and how many writers in Hindi, Urdu,
Bengali and some other languages including the well known Bankim Chandra
Chatterjee in their writings portrayed the Muslims as foreigners in their
novels and stories while identifying nationalism only with the Hindus (Bipin Chandra, 1988, p. 410) .
This in a way was the genesis of the two-nation theory, the subsequent
partition and the Kashmir conflict as we see it today. The two-nation theory sought to define the
primary identity of Muslims in the country based on their religion rather than
language or region. However, apart from the process of colonialism, identity
was also evolving and influenced by the evolving idea of India, as the two
nation theory was open to interpretation in the sense that it was not clear
whether it meant that Muslims and Hindus were separate nations or that it meant
Hindus and Muslims being autonomous groups could live in the same nation with
divided sovereignty and constitutional safeguards. With hindsight we know that
the turn of the events led the former interpretation to dominate the political
discourse. Even in 1941 the idea of Pakistan that Muslim league had conceived
was one that would be part of Indian confederation provided the Muslim and the
Hindu element stood on equal terms (Ayesha Jalal, 2004, p. 147) , which
considered a unitary center an artifact of colonialism. But the forces of
nationalism that were unleashed could not be controlled to arrive at a
calculated deal. The partition therefore was a foregone conclusion at this time
but the question of Kashmir got entangled in a web of competing nationalisms
and interests.
As the politico-economic struggle of the Kashmiri Muslims against the Dogra
state took shape in 1930s it got enmeshed in the anti-colonial politics of
India, with the leadership of the Kashmiri Muslims giving their grievances a
religious color (Zutshi, 2003, p. 215) . Though
according to some scholars the economic demand couched in religious terms was
perhaps the only means of re-engineering socio-economic conditions of Kashmir
at that time (Ayesha Jalal,
2004, p. 217) .
As the Kashmiri Muslims made their demands of the government of the state,
Kashmiri Pandits felt their privileged position threatened and both communities
accused each other of being ‘communal’. By 1940s the pan-Muslim identity had
become a political category and this was the time when in Kashmir the identity
of being a Muslim started dominating the identity of being Kashmiri.
The Kashmir Imbroglio:
Even after accession of Kashmir to India the
Kashmiri Muslims continued to define themselves as a natural community. The problems
we see today in Kashmir are a result of how this accession was seen as an
acceptance of the Hindu nationalism that sought to assimilate the Kashmiri
identity within the pan-Indian identity but could not understand the underlying
currents of Kashmiri nationalism taking shape. This was first evident in the
Devnagari-Persian script controversy when against the recommendations of the
educational reorganization committee the government of the state in 1940
ordered that there should be one common language Urdu but for reading and
writing both Devnagari and Persian script could be used. This was resented by
the Kashmiri Muslims for whom introduction of Devnagari script translated into
an attempt by the Dogra state to “Hinduize” Kashmir (Zutshi, 2003, p. 270) . It was not only an attempt to acculturate
Muslims but to further cause a linguistic split in Kashmir.
Post partition land-reform policies were introduced in 1950s but only small
number of Kashmiri Muslims benefitted, most of landlords in Kashmir still
remained Hindus while Muslims were mostly smallholders (Das, 2001, p. 35) . In a way the
inequalities of the past carried through and despite elections being conducted
because of corruption, rigging and nepotism there were few changes in the
economic landscape. The language of ‘constitutional rule ‘ even if honored more
in breach than in observance, certainly created more political awareness among
the Muslims of the state (Rai, 2004, p. 290) . In the early
1950s an elite driven process began to
rally support within the Kashmiri Muslims to draw legitimacy for the accession
but it was unintentionally and ironically scuttled by the same
ultra-nationalist Hindu organizations who wanted ‘full integration’ of Jammu
and Kashmir like other acceding states (Das, 2001, p. 36) . From this
point onwards constitutionalism as a solution to the Kashmir problem ceased to
exist as a strong centralization tendency in India with an urge to install
puppet governments in the state started eroding the confidence of the Kashmiri
Muslims in the post independence Indian state.
By the late 1970s India and Pakistan had fought multiple wars and this
further lead to a rise in the hegemonic control of the state by the center. By
1983 as a result of the polarization in the state the ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’
votes had consolidated into separate blocks, the electoral politics at this
time by the ruling party at the center led to a further institutionalization of
communal politics in Kashmir (Das, 2001, p.
41)
. During this time the Kashmiri Muslim
had decidedly started alienating itself from the state of India but this
alienation contained aspirations for both an independent state of Jammu and
Kashmir and one that wanted to merge with the Muslim state of Pakistan. From
1989 onwards the insurgency and armed resistance in Kashmir had begun which was
accompanied by rapid growth of Madrasas financed by Gulf money bringing in the
Wahabi form of Islam to Kashmir (Das, 2001, p.
48) .
This change could also be seen in the changing shape of mosques. Unlike the
older mosques, most of the new mosques in the Valley are dome-shaped,
reflecting increasing Middle-Eastern/Saudi influence (Anant, 2009, p. 768) .
Thus began not only a pogrom of violence against Kashmiri Pandits as they started
moving out of the valley but also the development of an external dimension to
the Kashmiri identity. For centuries the Kashmiri script was Perso-Arabic but
following the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley a new trend emerged
when Kashmiri Pandits started promoting the Devanagri script and as a
consequence the new generation of Kashmiri Pandits did not seem to understand
the Perso-Arabic script (Rashid, 2009) . Identity here
was in evolution and a permanent wedge was being driven between the Kashmiri
Pandits and the Kashmiri Muslims. While at the same time nationalism based on
religion sought to connect ethnically different Muslims from different
countries into forming the grand Muslim community ‘the Muslim Ummah’. In
Kashmir this could be seen in how the Kashmiri Muslims empathize with the cause
of the Palestinian nation. Identity is a function of nationalistic or
sub-nationalistic aspirations of the community. National liberation aspirations
in Kashmir that transformed into a call for ‘Islam in danger’ and ‘Jihad’ and
also created some internal security problems for India is a ramification of
this identity transformation which was a consequence of the change of ethnic
nationalism into a state-subverting ethnic nationalism. Both these factors make
the resolution of the Kashmir imbroglio very difficult.
Conclusion:
Post partition there is a tendency to see the Kashmir conflict primarily as a
‘territorial’ dispute or a ‘resource conflict’ and is made a case of strategic
imperatives by connecting it with the Siachen issue and control over water
resources when actually the Kashmir conflict has gotten enmeshed into conflict
of the ‘Muslim nationalism’ of Pakistan versus the ‘civic nationalism’ of India
both nationalism seeking to unite their communities by defining the other nationalism
as a disruptive opposing force.
It is therefore false to assume that any resolution to the Kashmir issue will
come by resolving the Siachen issue or the sharing of water resources because at
its heart the Kashmir issue is hostage to conflicting nationalities. While
there are still socio-economic problems in Kashmir, India cannot solve the
Kashmir issue by giving an economic pill either, as is evident in the case of
Tibet, where the Chinese strategy of economic development has failed to satiate
the yearning for a Tibetan homeland. A whole new generation of Tibetans born
outside Tibet, and who have never even seen their native land still feel
associated with the idea of a Tibetan nation.
The strategy of resolving the Kashmir problem in India should therefore be to
either resurrect the original Kashmiri identity or to wait for many generations
to alter the nationalist spirit in Kashmir, using ‘print capitalism’ to
re-engineer a new kind of identity which ceases to define itself on the basis
of ethnicity or religion and defines itself more on class terms. But this will
have to contend with the ‘Muslim nationalism’ in Pakistan which will seek to
draw in the Kashmiri into the ‘Muslim’ identity. Interestingly Pakistan itself
has started veering towards civic nationalism as it started discovering how its
Muslim nationalism transitioned into Sunni Islamic nationalism which started
alienating its Shia, Hazara and Baloch minorities. A Nation has a longer lifetime
than the people who assume its nationality and even though the Kashmiri nation
has not come into existence the Kashmiri nationalism has, and therefore taming
this nationalism in Kashmir is going to be long drawn out process.
Bibliography
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(Joy Mitra is a Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Law and Business Program at
Jindal School of International Affairs Email: 13jsia-jmitra@jgu.edu.in)
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